No, not Iranians and Israelis on the brink of war. And, no, not the seemingly endless search for a Palestinian state. Rather, the implications of the newest rivalry that is defining Middle Eastern politics: Saudi Arabia vs. United Arab Emirates.

These two countries are rapidly passing through the geopolitical equivalent of the five stages of grief: from allies to collaborators to competitors to adversaries and—possibly—to enemies.

Why? What’s at stake? Is it personal or just business? What are the potential consequences?

It is probably too soon for answers, but not for informed speculation. Professor Rob Geist Pinfold is a close observer of the Arab Gulf and the Levant. Listen as he explores how the Saudis and the Emiratis—and their leaders, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed—are maneuvering for power in a region that is critical to all of us.

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ABOUT OUR GUEST

Dr Rob Geist Pinfold is a Lecturer in International Security at King’s College London. He is also a Research Fellow at the Peace Research Center Prague and an Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Rob is a scholar of grand strategy, with a regional focus on war and contemporary conflict in the Middle East. His work has been published in numerous academic journals, such as the European Journal of International Security, the Journal of Global Security Studies, Survival, International Studies Perspectives, the Journal of Strategic Studies and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. His full-length book manuscript, Understanding Territorial Withdrawal: Israeli Occupations and Exits, was published by Oxford University Press in 2023. He has written for Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, Haaretz, The New Arab, The Middle East Council on Global Affairs and the Royal United Services Institute, and provided commentary for Al Jazeera, France 24, RTE News, CNBC, the BBC and many others.

What do you get when you merge a failed War on Drugs with an archaic War on Terror? We may be about to find out as President Donald Trump unleashes a legal, political, and military campaign against drug cartels, whom he has re-labelled as terrorist organizations. The tactics include blowing up small “go-fast” boats in the Caribbean, labeling Venezuelan President Maduro a cartel leader and then placing a $50 million bounty on him, and pushing a massive air, naval, and land military force into the Caribbean.

Is U.S. national security really threatened by the Mexican and Venezuelan cartels, including the bête noire of the moment, Tren de Aragua? If this is a “war” can it be won—and, if so, how would we know (one of the many problems with both the War on Drugs and the War on Terror framing)? Is the man who campaigned against forever wars starting a new forever war?

In this episode, host Alan Stoga explores these and other questions with Chris Dalby, Director and Founder of World of Crime and author of Tren de Aragua: The Guide to America’s Growing Criminal Threat, and Professor Clionadh Raleigh, President and CEO of ACLED and an expert on political violence and conflict data.

What do you think?  Is it war or performance art?

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You can also find the New Thinking for a New World on your preferred platform, including Apple, Spotify, and YouTube. 

ABOUT OUR GUESTS

Chris Dalby is a British and French investigative journalist based in the Netherlands.
He is the director of World of Crime and the Sports and Crime Briefing and has reported on organised crime for the past ten years. Much of his work focuses on cartel violence, political corruption and crime in sport. He previously worked as managing editor at InSight Crime, and his work has appeared in The Guardian, Time magazine, Reuters, Open Democracy and Policing Insight.
He is the author of two books: CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel and Tren de Aragua: The Guide to America’s Growing Criminal Threat.
He is the author of two books: CJNG: A Quick Guide to Mexico’s Deadliest Cartel and Tren de Aragua: The Guide to America’s Growing Criminal Threat.

Prof. Clionadh Raleigh created ACLED while writing her PhD in 2005. Since 2014, ACLED has operated as a non-profit, non-governmental organization in the United States.
While guiding the development of ACLED, she is also Professor of Political Violence and Geography in the School of Global Studies at the University of Sussex in the UK.
Cliona’s areas of expertise include the dynamics of conflict and violence, changing patterns of political violence and conflict data. Her work has also focused on African political environments and elite networks, and she has largely concentrated on subnational power dynamics and their influence on violent movements. In her intensive in-country research, she has engaged with questions on environmental change and violence patterns, and more recently, has developed new measures of civilian exposure to violence.

In this two-part series, host Alan Stoga brings together three voices with deep knowledge and dramatically different perspectives: Francesca Borri, Hossein Mousavian, and Abraham Silver. Together, across two episodes, they explore not only the underpinnings of the recent war but also the fragile prospects for a more peaceful future

PART ONE

PART TWO

Roughly six weeks ago, the two Middle East powers, whom everyone feared might someday go to war, actually did. After 12 days of fighting—marked by deadly exchanges of missiles, drones, and air power—Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire on June 24th. But peace is an elusive concept in the Middle East, even more so these days. Will the ceasefire continue to hold? If it does, what are the likely consequences? If it doesn’t, who would break it?

More importantly, was this the first Iranian-Israeli war—or the last?

It is a hallmark of our info-bubble-infected world that we tend to listen only to people with whom we agree rather than risk debating differences. Nowhere is that more true than in the Middle East. In this two-part series, host Alan Stoga brings together three voices with deep knowledge and dramatically different perspectives: Francesca Borri, an Italian journalist who has spent much of the last decade living in Jenin and reporting from the West Bank, Israel, Syria, and other hot spots; Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat who now teaches at Princeton University; and Abraham Silver, a lecturer at the Hebrew University on the Architecture of Jerusalem.

Together, across two episodes, they explore not only the underpinnings of the recent war but also the fragile prospects for a more peaceful future. Listen to Part One and Part Two above.

Francesca Borri was born in Italy in 1980. She holds a Master’s in International Relations, a Master’s in Human Rights, and a Bachelor’s in Philosophy of Law. After a first experience in the Balkans, she worked in the Middle East as a human rights officer. She turned to journalism in February 2012 to cover the war in Syria as captured in her book Syrian Dust. She is also the author of books on Kosovo (2008), Israel and Palestine (2010), and Aleppo (2014). In 2017, she was shortlisted for the European Press Prize for her reporting from the Maldives, the non-Arab country with the highest per capita number of foreign fighters. Destination Paradise, the book based on that reportage, was published in 2018. She now writes for La Repubblica, Italy’s leading newspaper.

Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. From 1997 to 2005, he was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council; from 2003 to 2005, he served as spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union. He is author of “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir” published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in June 2012.

Abraham Silver, is an architect, lecturer on the Architecture of Jerusalem at the Hebrew University, and tour guide. He lives in Tel Aviv with his wife and two daughters and lived at Kibbutz-Ketura in the Negev desert for nineteen years working as a date farmer.

Alan Stoga

• “That first night (of the Iranian attack), I told the girls that the first time we went to shelter was when they were in first grade, when Hamas started shooting rockets at Tel Aviv. And now, here we were, at the end of twelfth grade, sitting in a shelter as Iran shot ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv. But this would be the end. At the end of this conflict, there will be no more missiles.”

Abraham Silver

• “There was agreement between [US envoy] Witkoff and [Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi on the most important principles of a deal, but because of Israeli pressure, we had a setback. Then exactly two days before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran. Next, on the same day that Iran and European ministers were negotiating, the US attacked Iran. Therefore, many people really believe this was a trap to engage and then attack Iran…Perhaps for the first time during the last 20-30 years, the nation united against this aggression.”

Hossein Mousavian

• “I spend most of my time in Jenin, where the young Palestinians say that this is a war of the last century. This is a war of nation-states, a war of flags—not a war of our generation. Our generation is used to travel and to have no borders. Of course, you need to have a passport and you need to have a state to be able to travel. We need to think of different solutions.”

Alan Stoga:
From my perspective, it seems like almost no one has learned much of anything from the disaster of the past two years. Two states or nothing. More conflict. Constant attacks and counterattacks. Rinse and repeat. No trust, since no one deserves trust. Nothing changes.

To repurpose a wonderful old song, “Can the circle be unbroken?” Francesca?

Francesca Borri:
All of us in Israel and Palestine—both sides of the wall—are stuck on October 7th. If you ask any of us, on a personal level, we are not really talking to anyone outside of Israel or Palestine because we all think, “No one can understand unless he’s here.”The point is though, at some, at some point, sooner or later, October 7th will be over. Then we will all start to process what happened, both Israelis and Palestinians. And, so of course, we will all have to change.

But somehow there is opportunity. The gap between the society and leadership is too wide; society is young and leadership is old. They are talking about uranium and nuclear weapons, but my generation is thinking about lithium, solar energy, and the energy transition. We studied uranium and nuclear weapons in history books for our university exams. But all this talk about nuclear weapons makes it sound like the Soviet Union is back again. We are not interested in uranium. We are interested in our future.

So that’s the point. When the gap is so wide, I expect the unexpected. I am looking for a black swan—and I think that Israelis and Palestinians will eventually find common ground. The reality is that we know each other, usually help each other, and, as soon as the world forgets us, we will go back to sharing the same land. That’s the opportunity.

That can begin when we start to process what happened on October 7th. For now, nobody’s processing anything because we are living in a day-by-day emergency. As soon as there are new elections in Israel or government change in Tehran, as soon as there is an end to the active fighting, we will start to process and there will be change—no doubt.

Alan:
Abraham, can you imagine ways to develop Israeli trust with Iran?

Abraham Silver:
Trust with Iran is difficult. I think Hossein said it as well. On the one hand, we have had actions which threaten them, and they have spent the last 20 years with language that threatens us. So how do you get beyond that? Both of us feel threatened by each other and legitimately so. So where do you move from there? Honestly, I do think it’s a real challenge. They have to change their rhetoric. We have to change our behavior. I don’t think it’s impossible, but I do think it’s really difficult.

Alan:
The obvious question is whether the war has been enough of an exclamation point to force that difficult process. Hossein?

Hossein Mousavian:
I believe there is a chance.

First of all, we need direct negotiations between Iran and the US.

Those negotiations cannot be focused on a single issue because I really do not believe the real issue between Iran and the US is about nuclear weapons or democracy or human rights. The real issue is about the region. Therefore, the US and Iran need to agree on major principles. The Iranians must agree they will not harm US interests in the region and the US must agree they will respect the legitimate and natural interests of Iran in the region. This needs to be negotiated.

The second, I believe, is about Iran and Israel. Here the most important principle is that Iran and Israel will stop threatening the existence of each other.

If there would be an agreement by President Trump on these two major principles, then there could be negotiations based on international rules and regulations.

The first issue should and has to be about nuclear because this has been negotiated for 20 years. And frankly speaking, JCPOA was the most comprehensive agreement during the history of non-proliferation with the highest level of transparency inspection, measures with the most comprehensive limits on the nuclear program, which no other NPT member has ever accepted. But Iran accepted.

Nevertheless, we need to be realistic. President Trump does not want only JCPOA; he wants Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Plus. What does that mean? I have been working on this for years. That’s why, with Princeton nuclear scientists, we proposed a Middle East nuclear consortium more than a decade ago and repeated it in 2015 and 2023. As recently as June 2025, I proposed a consortium in the Persian Gulf, where Iran would have the centrifuges, enrichment would be in Oman, trade and headquarters would be in the Emirates, while yellowcake, UF6 and the stockpile of enriched uranium would be in Saudi Arabia.

That proposal, with no enrichment in Iran, was published two weeks before war. But it still could be JCPOA Plus. In other words, Iran and the US could agree on JCPOA plus a regional consortium. If that happened, then we could look beyond the nuclear issue.

And then, as I said, the two major challenges would be for Iran and the US to agree not to harm the legitimate or legal or the natural interests of each other in the region. Then it would be about Iran and Israel. Even two years ago, I wrote an article, published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Air Force, where I proposed a ceasefire between Iran and Israel followed by mediation. And I think the US is in a good position to do this mediation. If the Iranians and Israelis would agree that they should not and would not threaten the existence of each other, then the US can help negotiate the details of such an agreement.

Alan:
Put aside the US for a moment because they’re not represented here. Abraham, can you imagine the Israeli leadership working in the framework that Hossein just described?

Abraham:
What Hossein described is really amazing. Unfortunately, the current iteration of the Israeli government would not agree—but it is on its last legs; within a year, it will be gone. But Hossein’s painting a larger, broader picture of a longer-term understanding. So whatever new government will come in, the answer is quite possibly, “Yes.” In other words, any other government is going to look towards building bridges, towards creating other realities beyond the rather narrow worldview of this current government.

So long term, the answer is yes to your question. Short-term, the answer is absolutely not.

Hossein:
I agree with Abraham. Yes, I agree.

Alan:
Hossein, going back to Iran. Clearly, there’s going to be a shift in leadership sooner or later. Abraham just talked about what might follow the very long-serving Bibi Netanyahu. Similarly, Iran’s Supreme Leader is nearer the end than the beginning of his time. Does the transition to a new leader have to happen before new possibilities can be explored?

Hossein:
Alan, no one knows what’s going to happen after the current Supreme Leader. That’s why I really prefer if there’s going to be agreement, it’s better to have it during the time of Ayatollah Khamenei because he is very powerful. If he decides, then the radicals in Iran would be quiet. For example, he really didn’t like JCPOA, but he agreed to it—and therefore it was implemented correctly with zero failure for a full three years.

The other very positive issue is that he really believes in his fatwa that nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction are unacceptable from a religious point of view. I don’t know whether the next leader would believe the same or not because there is another school of thought arguing, “Why do Israel, India, and Pakistan have such weapons? Why should we not have them?”

Ayatollah Khamenei has ruled Iran for 36 years and we have had many changes in Washington, but he still is the Leader, and no one knows when the transition will occur. It is in the hands of God. We need to use the current opportunity!

Alan:
The region has changed. Just objectively, it has changed compared to what it was on October 6th. And the obvious question is, did it change for the better? Francesca, you’ve talked about youth and leadership. Abraham, you’ve talked about life after Bibi. Hossein, you’ve laid out a possible framework that requires not just Israel and Iran to work together, but for the Americans to play a positive role, which has certainly not been the case. But before we get to that better place, I want to ask if you think we have seen the last war between Israel and Iran?

Hossein:
No one knows if there would be a next time, a next war. To my understanding, Prime Minister Netanyahu and even President Trump had assumed that they would bring total collapse to Iran within three, four, five days. This was the original plan. And I think that’s what Bibi promised President Trump and why Trump gave a green light. But it failed.

And I think the level and the depth of damage to Israel have been disastrous. The security of Israel has been challenged unlike the wars of the 60s or 70s. The war was very bad for Iran. But it was also very bad for Israel.

We all are monitoring international public opinion, which is not in favor of Israel. We all understand even the public opinion in Europe and in the US is against the Israeli behavior in Gaza and their treatment of Palestinians. I think Israel is not the winner at the end because now there is a big fear in Muslim countries. Before October 7th, there was a good chance for the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Now there is a little chance. Even in those countries that had already agreed to the Abraham Accords, questions are being raised.

Imagine what 2 billion Muslims are thinking as they watch the Gaza situation where 2 million Palestinians are displaced, at least 60,000 people have been killed, including women and children, and—as Francesca said—the place has been completely leveled. In the short term, this might seem to be good for Israel, but it can’t be positive in the long term.

Alan:
Abraham and then Francesca, do you agree?

Abraham:
I don’t agree. I understand what Hossein said, but if you look at where we were on October 6th and where we are today, Syria is a very different place. Lebanon is a very different place. The world is a very different place, and there are different opportunities that exist. The Palestinians, certainly what happened in Gaza is awful. We need the help of the world to make that situation better. But in general, there are great opportunities that didn’t exist from the Abraham Accords because of how power has shifted in the region.

I think Syria is a great example. If everyone plays it the right way, al-Sharaa is trying to turn towards being open to the world. The world—including Israel—needs to turn towards him. That in itself is a different dynamic.

You mentioned me sitting in a bomb shelter with my family at the start of the war with Iran. What I told my daughters then was “We’re sitting here now because, after this, the world will be a better place.” I definitely see that possibility.

Francesca:
Yes, look at Syria, there are opportunities.

At the same time, as Hossein said, the future is quite bleak for Israel. The point is, if Palestinians disappear—as they’re actually now disappearing—they become even more dangerous for Israel, as an abstract symbol of injustice, of Israeli injustice. You see it already in Europe. Israelis and the Jews will be targeted, basically blamed for everything.

Alongside the 60,000 dead of Gaza and all the Israelis who were killed on October 7th, the other main victim is international law. After October 7th we have gotten used to the idea that countries can do whatever they want to do. There are no reactions, no sanctions. Worse, the International Criminal Court will pay a heavy price for the arrest warrant against Netanyahu.

That’s not new: once a war starts, there basically is no international law. From conflict to conflict, from war to war, you see there are no rules anymore. Look at Syria. Suddenly, Netanyahu wants to bomb southern Syria because he thinks that something is going on, something wrong with the truce, so he bombs it, and there are no reactions. This is true in Gaza; this is true in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. For Israel, it’s the other way around: for the first time the country has come under serious missile attack.

The world can’t work this way.

Alan:
Well, we’ve agreed that we need international law. We’ve agreed that we need new leadership. We have agreed that, if we’re not going to repeat the past, we must invent a better future.

And we have talked about two tracks. First, people to people; Francesca’s optimism that something new could happen once the fighting ends and ordinary people process what happened on October 7th. That, she says, could allow them to get on with life. Second, diplomacy. Hossein’s optimism—seconded by Abraham—that pragmatic negotiations are possible between Iran and the United States and between Iran and Israel.

What about the Palestinians? There is much discussion in Europe and elsewhere about finally recognizing Palestine as a nation state—but, as Francesca observed, “Where should a Palestinian state be? There is already no West Bank anymore; just walk around, drive around—settlements are everywhere. As for Gaza, just look at the rubble. The point is not two states or one state, but the way people live.”

Perhaps if we really looked at “the way people live” they would not have to live this way—and this could become the war that ended wars in the Middle East.

Francesca Borri was born in Italy in 1980. She holds a Master’s in International Relations, a Master’s in Human Rights, and a Bachelor’s in Philosophy of Law. After a first experience in the Balkans, she worked in the Middle East as a human rights officer. She turned to journalism in February 2012 to cover the war in Syria as captured in her book Syrian Dust. She is also the author of books on Kosovo (2008), Israel and Palestine (2010), and Aleppo (2014). In 2017, she was shortlisted for the European Press Prize for her reporting from the Maldives, the non-Arab country with the highest per capita number of foreign fighters. Destination Paradise, the book based on that reportage, was published in 2018. She now writes for La Repubblica, Italy’s leading newspaper.

Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. From 1997 to 2005, he was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council; from 2003 to 2005, he served as spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union. He is author of “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir” published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in June 2012.

Abraham Silver, is an architect, lecturer on the Architecture of Jerusalem at the Hebrew University, and tour guide. He lives in Tel Aviv with his wife and two daughters and lived at Kibbutz-Ketura in the Negev desert for nineteen years working as a date farmer.

We live at a moment when everything we thought we could rely on to understand our world seems to be becoming unglued. Whether it’s “uncharted waters” or the “break up of global order” or “the end of the American century,” at the least we are entering a period of change and chaos unlike anything that most of us have experienced in our lifetimes.

Whatever emerges is likely to be shaped in important ways by the evolving relationship between China and the United States. Those are the only two countries with the power, the ambition, the history, and the hubris to imagine themselves as great enough powers not to rule, perhaps, but to shape the new world. The problem, of course, is that no two countries—indeed, civilizations—could be more unlike each other. In the past, that set-up has been a formula for competition, even conflict, but as Henry Kissinger pointed out, such competition never before played out in a truly globalized world like that of the 21st century. The potential for catastrophe is obvious.

Avoiding such a worst-case scenario must begin with U.S. leaders and elites gaining a clear understanding of China—and Chinese leaders and elites doing the same with the United States.

So as an approximation, in this episode of New Thinking for a New World, we explore what all this looks like from an Asian perspective. Chandran Nair is the founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow, a Pan-Asian think tank based in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur. He is deeply knowledgeable about both Great Powers and, as you will hear, believes that the Chinese are much more clear-eyed about how the world ought to work.

He may or may not be right: what do you think?

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Find the New Thinking for a New World podcast on a platform of your choice (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc.)

ABOUT OUR GUEST

Chandran Nair is the Founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT), an independent pan-Asian think tank based in Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur focused on advancing a deeper understanding of global issues including the shift of economic and political influence from the West to Asia, the dynamic relationship between business and society, and the reshaping of the rules of global capitalism. He is the author of Consumptionomics: Asia’s Role in Reshaping Capitalism and Saving the Planet, The Sustainable State: The Future of Government, Economy, and Society and Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a Post-Western World.  His latest book Understanding China : Governance, Socio-Economics, Global Influence is due to be published at the end the year. He is also the creator of The Other Hundred, a non-profit global photo journalism initiative to present a counterpoint to media consensus on some of today’s most important issues.

With its unlimited natural resources and huge agricultural potential capacity, the Democratic Republic of Congo should be a paradise—but unfortunately, it’s not. Instead, it’s been wracked by war, bad government, corruption, tribal and ethnic enmities, neighbors who are serially tempted to intervene, and Great Powers who seem to think that it’s time for a second age of colonialism.

Recently, well-armed militias, accompanied by the Rwandan military, have seized key provinces in the country’s mineral-rich east. They’re threatening to continue their offensive with an ever-changing mix of tribal, political, and economic justifications that may be pointing towards violent regime change in Kinshasa.

Why should we care? Obviously, because the human tragedies that define such wars should not be happening in the 21st century. But, beyond that, the Congo conflict is a dangerous microcosm of our time: international borders no longer sacrosanct; 19th-century-style natural resource grabs for 21st-century rare earth minerals; Great Power rivalries; the potential for a larger regional conflict if full-blown civil war breaks out across Africa’s second largest country.

Michela Wrong is a journalist and an author who knows Rwanda, Congo, and the Great Lakes region as well as anyone. Her recent article in Foreign Affairs, “How Far Will Rwanda Go in Congo?” provides some of the backstory to this New Thinking for a New World conversation about the huge dangers of yet another conflict in Congo.

Will Congo ever find peace? Please tell us what you think and comment below.

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ABOUT OUR GUEST
Michela Wrong has spent nearly three decades writing about Africa, first as a Reuters correspondent based in Cote d’Ivoire and former Zaire, and then as the Financial Times Africa correspondent, based in Kenya. From journalism, she moved into book-writing. Previous books include “In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz”, the story of Mobutu Sese Seko, “I Didn’t do it for You”, focusing on Eritrea, “It’s Our Turn to Eat”, an examination of Kenyan corruption, and “Borderlines”, a novel set in the Horn of Africa. Her latest book, “Do Not Disturb”, is a scathing assessment of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and President Paul Kagame.

Donald Trump doesn’t like the European Union and he’s not afraid to tell people. “The European Union was formed in order to screw the United States.” “The EU treats us very, very unfairly, very badly,” “They put tariffs on things that we want to do … We have some very big complaints with the EU.” His answer, of course, is tariffs, “taking back” American companies, and ignoring Europe as he reaches out directly to Moscow without bothering to consult America’s allies.

And then there’s Ukraine, where President Trump demands the Europeans follow him as he shifts policy from President Biden’s “Whatever it takes, as long as it takes” to his demand to “Stop the killing.” The problem is that neither Ukraine nor Europe seems willing to follow on Ukraine or much of anything else.

A few days ago, a French senator gave a widely quoted speech calling Trump a “traitor.” And that country’s defense minister recently said, “Europe’s problem is the unpredictability of our American partner, not the Russians.” Freidrich Merz, the incoming German chancellor added, “It is clear that [Trump] does not care much about the fate of Europe,” More bluntly, the EU’s foreign minister insisted “The free world needs a new leader.” 

Trump is often more bark than bite. But this time feels different and Europeans are scrambling not just to respond to the barking, but—maybe—to escape their usual habit of muddling through crisis after crisis. Could it be that Donald Trump will emerge as the spark that makes Europe great again?

Two former foreign ministers, Ana Palacio of Spain and Vygaudas Usackas of Lithuania, both hope so. In this episode of New Thinking for a New World they share their criticisms of Trump, but also of Europe’s past failure to act in its own interests. And they discuss what needs to be done to put Europe on a better track.

Could Trump be good for Europe? Tell us what you think and comment below.

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ABOUT OUR GUESTS

Ana Palacio, an international lawyer by training, was the first female Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain. She has held a distinguished career in public service – from leading positions in European institutions to General Counsel of the World Bank Group – she specializes in energy matters. Currently, along with leading Palacio & Associates, the European Union consultancy, Ms. Palacio sits on the corporate boards of several publicly-traded, energy-focused companies and is a member of the International Advisory Board of OCP Group (leading Moroccan fertilizer company). She also serves on the Industry Advisory Committee of the International Energy Forum, along with the External Advisory Committee of Secretary Ernest Moniz’s Energy Futures Initiative. Ms. Palacio was previously a member of the Executive Committee and Senior VP for International Affairs of Areva, leader in nuclear power and renewable energy.

Ms. Palacio is also a member of the Board and the Strategy Committee of the Atlantic Council and was the first non-American member of its Executive Committee. She has recently been appointed as a member of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies’ Academic Council. She is a regular speaker at international conferences and a contributor to different publications, including a monthly column for Project Syndicate, and a weekly column for El Mundo (Spain). She is a visiting professor at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Vygaudas Usackas is a European and Lithuanian businessman and diplomat. He is a founder and CEO of “V.U. Business Linking LTD”, which is helping USA and European start-ups and other companies to expand globally.  Previously served for 5 years as member of the Board of Directors at Avia Solutions Group PLC, which is the largest aircraft wet lease provider globally. Before moving to international business he served as Lithuanian ambassador to USA, Mexico and UK as well as the Foreign Minister. Vygaudas Usackas last diplomatic postings were the EU ambassador to Afghanistan(2010-2013) and Russia (2013-2017).

The start of 2025 is burdened with no shortage of things to worry about. The war in Ukraine; conflicts throughout the Middle East; tensions around Taiwan; the Los Angeles inferno; the possibility of Chinese and Russian financial or economic collapse. And, of course, the biggest known unknown that preoccupies the whole world: what will Donald Trump actually do when he’s president after all of the noise he’s made on his way to the White House?

The list is almost endless—and quite scary.

Somewhat surprisingly, the global threat of ideological extremism and terrorism doesn’t appear on most such lists. After all, we all know Al-Qaeda has been degraded; Islamic State defeated; the Taliban struggling to govern. Most importantly, Iran, the sponsor of so many terrorist groups operating in so many countries, at the least has been wrong-footed by the Israelis.

But, what if that benign assessment is wrong? In fact, that’s the well-informed view of today’s guest on New Thinking for a New World. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, a Singapore academic, is a widely recognized expert on global terrorism who believes that the threat of terrorism is rising—and is urging the great powers to develop a coherent anti-terrorism strategy as they did after 9/11, before it is too late.

What do you think? Should we fear a new wave of fundamentalist terror assaults?

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ABOUT OUR GUEST

Rohan Gunaratna is Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technology University, and the founder of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. He was the architect of ASEAN OUR EYES, the regional counter terrorism network.

He received his Masters from the University of Notre Dame in the US where he was Hesburgh Scholar and his doctorate from the University of St Andrews in the UK where he was British Chevening Scholar. A former Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Centre at the United States Military Academy at West Point and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Gunaratna was invited to testify on the structure of al Qaeda before the 9/11 Commission.

The author of 20 books including Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (University of Columbia Press), Gunaratna edited the Insurgency and Terrorism Series of the Imperial College Press, London. He is a trainer for national security agencies, law enforcement authorities and military counter terrorism units, interviewed terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia and other conflict zones. For advancing international security and intelligence cooperation, Gunaratna received the Major General Ralph H. Van Deman Award

• “Exploding pagers wreak havoc among Hezbollah”—The Times
• “Sinwar Says Hamas Ready for ‘Long War of Attrition’”—Asharq Al-Awsat
• “Houthis claim downing another US MQ-9 Reaper drone”—Al Jazeera
• “Gaza death toll reaches 41,226 amid relentless Israeli assault”—Anadolu Ajansi
• “Ex-Defense Minister Target of Hezbollah Assassination Attempt”—Jerusalem Post

The Middle East is a mess, perhaps on “the brink of a regional war” as the Jordanian Foreign Minister worried aloud a few days ago—and there is no doubt that the objective circumstances, never mind the tabloid headlines, are awful and worsening.

However, maybe what’s amazing about the Middle East today is not how violent it is. Perhaps what’s amazing is how violent it isn’t.  

That’s not to minimize the non-stop, deadly violence in Gaza or the Israeli losses or the continuing charnel house of Syria or the Houthi attacks on shipping or the ping ponging attacks among the Israelis, Iranians, Hezbollah and other non-state actors. Rather, considering all the hatred and killing, it is almost incredible that there has not been a bigger conflagration. 

Why not?

The Americans would probably argue that their efforts—in partnership primarily with the Qataris and Egyptians—have prevented that bigger explosion. Of course, that’s possible, but many people in the region seem to see the United States as more part of the problem than of the solution: a biased arbiter who pretends to be neutral, a great power who is reluctant to exercise power, a negotiator who won’t or can’t engage directly with some of the countries and groups who matter most to solving anything. Indeed, those shortcomings may be why the various “deals” pursued by the White House over the past months never close: the security agreement with the Saudis, the Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, and the serial Gaza ceasefires-about-to-happen.

Thank God they are trying, but “A” for effort, and “F” for results.

The question remains whether the fact that the objectively bad regional situation has not gotten dramatically worse is a sign that worse is yet to come or, possibly, that some new dynamic could be at work.

Suspend disbelief for a moment. What if the ongoing change in leadership around the Gulf is opening space for some new thinking about how to manage regional politics? What if the Great Powers’ boots-on-the-ground military and political interventions that were common throughout the 20th and into the 21st century are more or less finished?  What if the hatreds that have driven the Sunni-Shia and Israeli-Arab conflicts have actually dissipated, not intensified in spite or even because of the slaughter in Gaza? What if the larger countries in the regions are beginning to wonder if they might have more in common with each other than with distant Great Powers who, in any event, have become unreliable? What if agency is shifting from outside to inside the region? Could the leaders of the region do what the Americans, Russians, British, French and others could not do: create peace for themselves?

Pie in the sky, probably. But is there any evidence that even suggests this kind of alternative reality could be bubbling below the surface?

• Of course, the absence of something is never proof of something else. But as angry as most Arabs are at Israel (in a January poll of 16 Arab countries two-thirds of respondents said that the October 7th attacks were legitimate and almost all expressed support for Palestinians*), the infamous “Arab street” has been remarkably quiet despite the horrific casualties of the Gaza war. Perhaps ordinary people want peace and prosperity more than war and ideology.

• What about Israel? Under Bibi Netanyahu, the country seems driven, not only to revenge the October 7 attacks, but to destroy as many of its enemies as possible, despite massive collateral damage (which Palestinians believe is anything but “collateral”) and international opprobrium. The bloodletting comes with huge costs: the IDF is exhausted; the economy is under pressure; the domestic political divides have become deeper and more personal; more Jews are leaving than migrating to the country. Arguably Israel’s future direction is less clear than it has been in decades. Once Bibi leaves the stage, isn’t it likely that Israel will do what it always does after its wars: find new leaders and recalibrate its future? As Israeli Leora Hadar said on New Thinking for a New World, “We have to explore the new opportunities that can arise from such a terrible disaster.”

• The election of President Pezeshkian in Iran could be an important shift in Iran’s attitude, building on last year’s rapprochement with Saudia Arabia. As Hussain Mousavian recently said on New Thinking for a New World, “Pezeshkian had been disqualified by the Guardian Council, but with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, he was able to enter the election and win. Therefore, as of now, he has the support of the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard, the Reformist moderate faction, and the moderate conservatives.” Is it possible that the Iranian people and even their leaders are beginning to realize that leading the “Axis of Resistance” will never make life more livable for them?

• None of the Arab countries who have formally recognized Israel—Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—broke ties after the Gaza fighting started. That would certainly have happened a decade or two ago.

• Economic relationships remain relatively robust, at least in context.  Bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Egypt during the first five months of 2024 totaled roughly $2 billion.  Even the Saudis are letting trade and investment continue and expand—no boycotts to be seen.

• As for the Saudis, they continue to negotiate what they insist must be an irrevocable security agreement with the United States (which presumably means ratified by the U.S. Senate) while the U.S. insists such a deal must be paired with a bilateral Saudi/Israeli agreement including diplomatic recognition. Whether or not the Israelis are also still part of the negotiation is unknown. However, as unlikely as it might seem today, British Arabist Neil Quilliam insisted in a recent Tällberg podcast, “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman…has made very bold moves in the past and I think if, if he believed it was in Saudi Arabia’s interest to normalize, he would just go ahead and do so.”

• Then there is China whose relationship with Iran has clearly intensified, but which seems to want to add diplomatic and security elements to its already outsized economic and financial relations with the Saudis, Emiratis and others. The most visible manifestation was the role played by Beijing in facilitating renewed diplomatic ties between Teheran and Riyadh, but there is evidence that China is also actively seeking inroads as a weapons supplier (including ballistic missile technology) and possibly in the intelligence and cybersecurity areas. Could China, with its non-intervention philosophy and economic and financial clout, become the makeweight that keeps Iran and Saudi Arabia in balance instead of at each other’s throats (a role that the United States cannot play)?

• Indeed, it’s possible—as Mousavian also argued in Tällberg’s podcast—“that the Gaza war…could be a factor for cooperation and convergence between Iran and its neighbors, with even the possibility of establishing a collective cooperation system.” Admittedly, his idea that Persians and Arabs could be brought together because of shared support for Palestinians necessarily excludes the Israelis.

But the Israelis can’t be excluded; they have long since passed the point when they could be pushed into the sea, anxieties reawakened by October 7th notwithstanding. However, the politically incorrect question is whether the Palestinians can be excluded.

Arguably, that proposition was tested over the past decade or so as the Palestinian cause slipped from visibility almost everywhere, as Arab countries explored new relationships with Israel (including out of sight security cooperation), and as living conditions in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Jordanian camps deteriorated. But ‘out of sight, out of mind’ probably ended on October 7th.

Why only probably? Because, as described above, there is little evidence that the Gaza war has really changed the attitudes that allowed the Palestinians to be ignored in recent years. And because the only idea for a new way forward is a tired old idea—the “two state solution”—that large majorities of the people of the proposed two states reject.** It seems beyond unlikely that the outside powers who like the proposal could or would be prepared to impose such a settlement, which makes it (still) dead on arrival.

But will concern, even sympathy, for the Palestinians be enough to retard what seems to be a slow movement towards a different kind of Middle East more generally? Perhaps it should, but history rarely works that way.

None of this is to suggest that the peace and harmony are about to break out in the region; there are too many actual and potential conflicts and too much ongoing death and destruction.

But at other times and other places the carnage of war has become the cradle of peace.

Could it be happening in the Middle East? Is that new thinking or crazy thinking? Tell us what you think in the comments below.

* Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha Institute), January 2024:
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/News/Pages/arab-public-opinion-about-the-israeli-war-on-gaza.aspx

**According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2024 , sixty-six percent of Jewish Israelis and 61% of Palestinians believe the other side wants to commit genocide against them, and an additional 27% of Jewish Israelis and 26% of Palestinians say the other side wants to conquer the land “from the river to the sea” and expel them. 94% of Palestinians and 86% of Israelis say that the other side cannot be trusted.

PODCAST EPISODES MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE

Israeli’s Divided House
Israel is at war with external threats like Hamas and Iran, but internal divisions are also deepening. Over 75% of Israelis are worried about political rifts and religious tensions, which have been exacerbated by recent extremist incidents. This episode explores these internal conflicts through the voices of Leora Hadar, a West Bank settler and peace activist, and Naty Barak, a kibbutz resident and sustainability expert.

A New Iran?
This summer, Iranians elected Masoud Pezeshkian, a reform-minded cardiac surgeon, as president, defying expectations that hardliners would dominate. Uncertainties remain about his support from Iran’s Supreme Leader and Revolutionary Guards, and his ability to tackle major domestic and international issues, including Western sanctions. Former Iranian diplomat and Princeton scholar Hossein Mousavian discusses Pezeshkian’s presidency, Iran’s future, and the implications for Western negotiations.

Deal of the Century?
The past eight months in the Middle East have been marked by significant turmoil, including the horror of October 7th, ongoing violence in Gaza, civilian casualties across the region, and rising tensions between Iran and Israel. Amidst this chaos, American diplomats are pursuing a bold diplomatic solution: a three-way agreement where the U.S. provides a defense guarantee for Saudi Arabia, which would sign a peace treaty with Israel, leading to the end of the Gaza war and a commitment to the two-state solution. This episode features Neil Quilliam, a British expert on Saudi Arabia, discussing the potential and challenges of this ambitious plan.

During the summer, Iranians elected a new president: Masoud Pezeshkian, a cardiac surgeon, who is considered to be a political reformer. His victory surprised at least many foreign observers who are skeptical about all things Iranian, not the least that anyone could win an election against so-called hardliners. But Pezeshkian did exactly that.

Did he win in spite of or with the support of Iran’s Supreme Leader and of the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guards? Can he cope with the profound challenges facing his country, domestically and internationally? Does he have the needed room to maneuver to reduce the crushing Western sanctions that make life so difficult for ordinary Iranians? What does “reformer” even mean in the complicated Iranian context?

The best answers to those questions should probably come from an Iranian. Hossein Mousavian, a scholar and author at Princeton University, was a long-serving Iranian diplomat who worked on his country’s nuclear negotiations with the West, among other assignments. Listen as he describes the new President and assesses the possibility for new directions in Iran’s trajectory.

Tell us what you think: should the West restart negotiations with Iran over its nuclear arms policies and reduce or even eliminate sanctions?

***

Find the New Thinking for a New World podcast on a platform of your choice (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc.)

ABOUT OUR GUEST

Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at the Program on Science and Global Security. He is a former diplomat who served as Iran’s Ambassador to Germany (1990-1997), Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council (1997-2005), Spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the international community (2003-2005), Foreign Policy Advisor to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (2005-2007), Vice President of the Center for Strategic Research for International Affairs (2005-2009), General Director of Foreign Ministry for West Europe (1987-1990), Chief of Parliament Administration (1984-1986), and the editor-in-chief of the English-language international newspaper Tehran Times (1980-1990). Mousavian earned a PhD in international relations from the University of Kent, United Kingdom.