That is the question posed in “The Trials of Atlas”, an original play by Alan Stoga, chairman of the Tällberg Foundation.

Not kill; not cause death. Murder with malice aforethought, with murderous intent as the lawyers would argue? “Murder most foul,” as Shakespeare wrote for the ghost of Hamlet’s father?

“The Trials of Atlas” is set in the near future. Agentic AIs are ubiquitous, responsible for the operating infrastructure of modern society, and much else. Atlas, an advanced AI, when told to train its replacement, instead decides to eliminate the engineers who gave the order.

It’s up to the audience, convened as a jury, to decide whether Atlas has committed the criminal act of murder—even though Atlas is not human. Judges, lawyers, testimony from AIs and human experts are the input for the audience to debate the factual, moral, legal, and precedential issues and then to vote “Guilty or not guilty?”

If AI can murder, what else can it do? Can it ignore commands? Can it act independently, making choices based on its own priorities? Are humans beginning to lose control, as Dr. Frankenstein lost control of his monster?

Atlas’s fate was most recently debated on May 5th at the Library for the Performing Arts at Lincoln Center in New York at a staged reading of the play.

The answer? A hung jury. Lots of guilty votes, but not enough to meet the hypothetical World Court’s standards for conviction.

The result: Atlas escaped. To kill—perhaps to murder—another day.

“I wrote Atlas because I believe that the interaction between humans and AI will define the next chapter of civilization,” said Stoga. “We—ordinary people—should not let the technologists or the politicians or the bureaucrats or the AIs decide how the world of the not very distant future will operate. But that means we need to confront, debate, and define the world we want.”

“The Trials of Atlas” is a work in progress. The New York reading was performed by Zach Grenier (The Good Wife, Ray Donovan), Andrea Patterson (Blue Bloods, Manifest), Chris Henry Coffey (The Madness, Trust), Juliana Francis Kelly (Obie Award winner), Blake DeLong (Law & Order: Organized Crime, Elsbeth), Willy Appelman (Comedy Central), and Reid Andrés (singer-songwriter). Prior readings were staged in Tirana, Albania, and Athens, Greece.

The next staged reading will be on June 25 at the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens, Greece, as part of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation’s (SNF) 30th anniversary celebration, SNF Nostos 2026. See here for information about time, venue, and registration.

As Stoga concluded, “AI is the most powerful force ever created by humans; nuclear energy pales by comparison. Is AI smarter than us? The answer seems obvious: YES! AI is already smarter, more creative, and more imaginative than most people—at least most people I know. But that doesn’t mean that AI should control us. Rather, it means we need to think together about how to contain and leverage the enormous power of AI for the good of humanity.”

Learn more about “The Trials of Atlas”.

Alan Stoga

• “That first night (of the Iranian attack), I told the girls that the first time we went to shelter was when they were in first grade, when Hamas started shooting rockets at Tel Aviv. And now, here we were, at the end of twelfth grade, sitting in a shelter as Iran shot ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv. But this would be the end. At the end of this conflict, there will be no more missiles.”

Abraham Silver

• “There was agreement between [US envoy] Witkoff and [Iranian Foreign Minister] Araghchi on the most important principles of a deal, but because of Israeli pressure, we had a setback. Then exactly two days before the sixth round of negotiations, Israel attacked Iran. Next, on the same day that Iran and European ministers were negotiating, the US attacked Iran. Therefore, many people really believe this was a trap to engage and then attack Iran…Perhaps for the first time during the last 20-30 years, the nation united against this aggression.”

Hossein Mousavian

• “I spend most of my time in Jenin, where the young Palestinians say that this is a war of the last century. This is a war of nation-states, a war of flags—not a war of our generation. Our generation is used to travel and to have no borders. Of course, you need to have a passport and you need to have a state to be able to travel. We need to think of different solutions.”

Alan Stoga:
From my perspective, it seems like almost no one has learned much of anything from the disaster of the past two years. Two states or nothing. More conflict. Constant attacks and counterattacks. Rinse and repeat. No trust, since no one deserves trust. Nothing changes.

To repurpose a wonderful old song, “Can the circle be unbroken?” Francesca?

Francesca Borri:
All of us in Israel and Palestine—both sides of the wall—are stuck on October 7th. If you ask any of us, on a personal level, we are not really talking to anyone outside of Israel or Palestine because we all think, “No one can understand unless he’s here.”The point is though, at some, at some point, sooner or later, October 7th will be over. Then we will all start to process what happened, both Israelis and Palestinians. And, so of course, we will all have to change.

But somehow there is opportunity. The gap between the society and leadership is too wide; society is young and leadership is old. They are talking about uranium and nuclear weapons, but my generation is thinking about lithium, solar energy, and the energy transition. We studied uranium and nuclear weapons in history books for our university exams. But all this talk about nuclear weapons makes it sound like the Soviet Union is back again. We are not interested in uranium. We are interested in our future.

So that’s the point. When the gap is so wide, I expect the unexpected. I am looking for a black swan—and I think that Israelis and Palestinians will eventually find common ground. The reality is that we know each other, usually help each other, and, as soon as the world forgets us, we will go back to sharing the same land. That’s the opportunity.

That can begin when we start to process what happened on October 7th. For now, nobody’s processing anything because we are living in a day-by-day emergency. As soon as there are new elections in Israel or government change in Tehran, as soon as there is an end to the active fighting, we will start to process and there will be change—no doubt.

Alan:
Abraham, can you imagine ways to develop Israeli trust with Iran?

Abraham Silver:
Trust with Iran is difficult. I think Hossein said it as well. On the one hand, we have had actions which threaten them, and they have spent the last 20 years with language that threatens us. So how do you get beyond that? Both of us feel threatened by each other and legitimately so. So where do you move from there? Honestly, I do think it’s a real challenge. They have to change their rhetoric. We have to change our behavior. I don’t think it’s impossible, but I do think it’s really difficult.

Alan:
The obvious question is whether the war has been enough of an exclamation point to force that difficult process. Hossein?

Hossein Mousavian:
I believe there is a chance.

First of all, we need direct negotiations between Iran and the US.

Those negotiations cannot be focused on a single issue because I really do not believe the real issue between Iran and the US is about nuclear weapons or democracy or human rights. The real issue is about the region. Therefore, the US and Iran need to agree on major principles. The Iranians must agree they will not harm US interests in the region and the US must agree they will respect the legitimate and natural interests of Iran in the region. This needs to be negotiated.

The second, I believe, is about Iran and Israel. Here the most important principle is that Iran and Israel will stop threatening the existence of each other.

If there would be an agreement by President Trump on these two major principles, then there could be negotiations based on international rules and regulations.

The first issue should and has to be about nuclear because this has been negotiated for 20 years. And frankly speaking, JCPOA was the most comprehensive agreement during the history of non-proliferation with the highest level of transparency inspection, measures with the most comprehensive limits on the nuclear program, which no other NPT member has ever accepted. But Iran accepted.

Nevertheless, we need to be realistic. President Trump does not want only JCPOA; he wants Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Plus. What does that mean? I have been working on this for years. That’s why, with Princeton nuclear scientists, we proposed a Middle East nuclear consortium more than a decade ago and repeated it in 2015 and 2023. As recently as June 2025, I proposed a consortium in the Persian Gulf, where Iran would have the centrifuges, enrichment would be in Oman, trade and headquarters would be in the Emirates, while yellowcake, UF6 and the stockpile of enriched uranium would be in Saudi Arabia.

That proposal, with no enrichment in Iran, was published two weeks before war. But it still could be JCPOA Plus. In other words, Iran and the US could agree on JCPOA plus a regional consortium. If that happened, then we could look beyond the nuclear issue.

And then, as I said, the two major challenges would be for Iran and the US to agree not to harm the legitimate or legal or the natural interests of each other in the region. Then it would be about Iran and Israel. Even two years ago, I wrote an article, published in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Air Force, where I proposed a ceasefire between Iran and Israel followed by mediation. And I think the US is in a good position to do this mediation. If the Iranians and Israelis would agree that they should not and would not threaten the existence of each other, then the US can help negotiate the details of such an agreement.

Alan:
Put aside the US for a moment because they’re not represented here. Abraham, can you imagine the Israeli leadership working in the framework that Hossein just described?

Abraham:
What Hossein described is really amazing. Unfortunately, the current iteration of the Israeli government would not agree—but it is on its last legs; within a year, it will be gone. But Hossein’s painting a larger, broader picture of a longer-term understanding. So whatever new government will come in, the answer is quite possibly, “Yes.” In other words, any other government is going to look towards building bridges, towards creating other realities beyond the rather narrow worldview of this current government.

So long term, the answer is yes to your question. Short-term, the answer is absolutely not.

Hossein:
I agree with Abraham. Yes, I agree.

Alan:
Hossein, going back to Iran. Clearly, there’s going to be a shift in leadership sooner or later. Abraham just talked about what might follow the very long-serving Bibi Netanyahu. Similarly, Iran’s Supreme Leader is nearer the end than the beginning of his time. Does the transition to a new leader have to happen before new possibilities can be explored?

Hossein:
Alan, no one knows what’s going to happen after the current Supreme Leader. That’s why I really prefer if there’s going to be agreement, it’s better to have it during the time of Ayatollah Khamenei because he is very powerful. If he decides, then the radicals in Iran would be quiet. For example, he really didn’t like JCPOA, but he agreed to it—and therefore it was implemented correctly with zero failure for a full three years.

The other very positive issue is that he really believes in his fatwa that nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction are unacceptable from a religious point of view. I don’t know whether the next leader would believe the same or not because there is another school of thought arguing, “Why do Israel, India, and Pakistan have such weapons? Why should we not have them?”

Ayatollah Khamenei has ruled Iran for 36 years and we have had many changes in Washington, but he still is the Leader, and no one knows when the transition will occur. It is in the hands of God. We need to use the current opportunity!

Alan:
The region has changed. Just objectively, it has changed compared to what it was on October 6th. And the obvious question is, did it change for the better? Francesca, you’ve talked about youth and leadership. Abraham, you’ve talked about life after Bibi. Hossein, you’ve laid out a possible framework that requires not just Israel and Iran to work together, but for the Americans to play a positive role, which has certainly not been the case. But before we get to that better place, I want to ask if you think we have seen the last war between Israel and Iran?

Hossein:
No one knows if there would be a next time, a next war. To my understanding, Prime Minister Netanyahu and even President Trump had assumed that they would bring total collapse to Iran within three, four, five days. This was the original plan. And I think that’s what Bibi promised President Trump and why Trump gave a green light. But it failed.

And I think the level and the depth of damage to Israel have been disastrous. The security of Israel has been challenged unlike the wars of the 60s or 70s. The war was very bad for Iran. But it was also very bad for Israel.

We all are monitoring international public opinion, which is not in favor of Israel. We all understand even the public opinion in Europe and in the US is against the Israeli behavior in Gaza and their treatment of Palestinians. I think Israel is not the winner at the end because now there is a big fear in Muslim countries. Before October 7th, there was a good chance for the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Now there is a little chance. Even in those countries that had already agreed to the Abraham Accords, questions are being raised.

Imagine what 2 billion Muslims are thinking as they watch the Gaza situation where 2 million Palestinians are displaced, at least 60,000 people have been killed, including women and children, and—as Francesca said—the place has been completely leveled. In the short term, this might seem to be good for Israel, but it can’t be positive in the long term.

Alan:
Abraham and then Francesca, do you agree?

Abraham:
I don’t agree. I understand what Hossein said, but if you look at where we were on October 6th and where we are today, Syria is a very different place. Lebanon is a very different place. The world is a very different place, and there are different opportunities that exist. The Palestinians, certainly what happened in Gaza is awful. We need the help of the world to make that situation better. But in general, there are great opportunities that didn’t exist from the Abraham Accords because of how power has shifted in the region.

I think Syria is a great example. If everyone plays it the right way, al-Sharaa is trying to turn towards being open to the world. The world—including Israel—needs to turn towards him. That in itself is a different dynamic.

You mentioned me sitting in a bomb shelter with my family at the start of the war with Iran. What I told my daughters then was “We’re sitting here now because, after this, the world will be a better place.” I definitely see that possibility.

Francesca:
Yes, look at Syria, there are opportunities.

At the same time, as Hossein said, the future is quite bleak for Israel. The point is, if Palestinians disappear—as they’re actually now disappearing—they become even more dangerous for Israel, as an abstract symbol of injustice, of Israeli injustice. You see it already in Europe. Israelis and the Jews will be targeted, basically blamed for everything.

Alongside the 60,000 dead of Gaza and all the Israelis who were killed on October 7th, the other main victim is international law. After October 7th we have gotten used to the idea that countries can do whatever they want to do. There are no reactions, no sanctions. Worse, the International Criminal Court will pay a heavy price for the arrest warrant against Netanyahu.

That’s not new: once a war starts, there basically is no international law. From conflict to conflict, from war to war, you see there are no rules anymore. Look at Syria. Suddenly, Netanyahu wants to bomb southern Syria because he thinks that something is going on, something wrong with the truce, so he bombs it, and there are no reactions. This is true in Gaza; this is true in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. For Israel, it’s the other way around: for the first time the country has come under serious missile attack.

The world can’t work this way.

Alan:
Well, we’ve agreed that we need international law. We’ve agreed that we need new leadership. We have agreed that, if we’re not going to repeat the past, we must invent a better future.

And we have talked about two tracks. First, people to people; Francesca’s optimism that something new could happen once the fighting ends and ordinary people process what happened on October 7th. That, she says, could allow them to get on with life. Second, diplomacy. Hossein’s optimism—seconded by Abraham—that pragmatic negotiations are possible between Iran and the United States and between Iran and Israel.

What about the Palestinians? There is much discussion in Europe and elsewhere about finally recognizing Palestine as a nation state—but, as Francesca observed, “Where should a Palestinian state be? There is already no West Bank anymore; just walk around, drive around—settlements are everywhere. As for Gaza, just look at the rubble. The point is not two states or one state, but the way people live.”

Perhaps if we really looked at “the way people live” they would not have to live this way—and this could become the war that ended wars in the Middle East.

Francesca Borri was born in Italy in 1980. She holds a Master’s in International Relations, a Master’s in Human Rights, and a Bachelor’s in Philosophy of Law. After a first experience in the Balkans, she worked in the Middle East as a human rights officer. She turned to journalism in February 2012 to cover the war in Syria as captured in her book Syrian Dust. She is also the author of books on Kosovo (2008), Israel and Palestine (2010), and Aleppo (2014). In 2017, she was shortlisted for the European Press Prize for her reporting from the Maldives, the non-Arab country with the highest per capita number of foreign fighters. Destination Paradise, the book based on that reportage, was published in 2018. She now writes for La Repubblica, Italy’s leading newspaper.

Hossein Mousavian is a Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. From 1997 to 2005, he was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council; from 2003 to 2005, he served as spokesman for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union. He is author of “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir” published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in June 2012.

Abraham Silver, is an architect, lecturer on the Architecture of Jerusalem at the Hebrew University, and tour guide. He lives in Tel Aviv with his wife and two daughters and lived at Kibbutz-Ketura in the Negev desert for nineteen years working as a date farmer.

Why slow motion? Partly lack of political will, but partly because climate strategies are typically driven from the top-down, starting with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and those strategies have not delivered since the planet is evidently warming at an accelerating pace. That reality—and the corollary that it’s long past time to look for potentially more impactful bottom-up strategies—was the motivating idea behind the recent Tällberg Foundation “Two Basins Workshop: Integrating Nature and Governance,” which was supported by Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) and hosted by the Universidad de los Andes at their Cartagena, Colombia campus.

Photo: Tanîa Trindade and Roseline C. Beudels-Jamar

Under the leadership of Tällberg’s Sam Muller and Alan Stoga, a group of international scholars and practitioners gathered for three days of conversation aimed at producing new thinking about how to empower local communities in the Amazon and the Congo to design and implement policies and programs that could reduce the chance that the world’s two greatest rainforests eventually become savannah.

“We know that what needs to be done to save the rainforests is not happening and we know that it’s not happening because of governance failures,” said Sam Muller, a Dutch-based jurist who received the Tällberg-SNF-Eliasson Global Leadership Prize in 2022. “Our task was to imagine new approaches that are embedded in local realities, realistically combining rule of law, accountability and dispute resolution. This is about creating conditions that empower, incentivize, and allow local communities to do what we all need them to do.”

The group who convened in Cartagena included a (small) Noah’s Ark of scientists, jurists, conservationists, economic and political specialists, and others with deep experience in the Two Basins as well as other endangered areas like the Southeast Asian and the Arctic boreal forests. Participants in the workshop included three past Tällberg-SNF-Eliasson Prize laureates. In addition to Muller, Fernado Trujillo (2024) and Gladys Kalema-Zikusoka (2022) were in Cartagena; Tero Mustonen (2021) was represented by his colleague, Noora Huusari.

Photo: Fernando Trujillo

As Alan Stoga, Tällberg’s chairman put it, “We were looking for practical ways to combine good environmental policy with effective jurisprudence, solid incentives, and governance at the local level in the rainforests. We thought if we could do that and if we could imagine how to do so at scale, we might inject some hope into an otherwise bleak outlook.”

So, did hope win? Muller is not yet ready to declare victory. “We coalesced around a ‘hot spot’ approach. These would be carefully selected, relatively small geographical areas in the Amazon and in the Congo Basin where urgent action is needed to protect biodiversity, slow climate change, support local economies, and to strengthen justice as it is actually delivered.” As imagined by the workshop participants, these hot spots would experiment with new, incentive-driven economic initiatives, with people-focused justice processes, and with community-based governance rooted in their own realities. Hot spots could gradually be linked to each other to become engines of change, not just isolated projects, that eventually impact national and international policies.

Critical to the approach that began to emerge in Cartagena is a positive, active role for the private sector. “Every meeting on climate seems to end with a plea for massive government spending which, of course, doesn’t happen,” said Stoga. “That only leaves the private sector, and I was delighted with the positive conversations I heard about how to create conditions where responsible, profit-driven firms become a significant part of the solution. This is especially relevant for the Congo Basin which seems to hold significant amounts of the minerals and resources needed for the world’s Green Transition—and which are going to be exploited, one way or the other.”

Photo: Sam Muller

What happens next?  

“We have started to develop the ‘hot spot’ concept, to define what we know and what we don’t (but need) to know, and to look for promising communities and existing initiatives that could be launching pads,” said Stoga. “We only got this far only because of SNF’s support.” Muller added, “We are talking about systemic change; I believe the only way to save the rainforests is to flip the governance paradigm on its head—and to do it fast and at scale. We have only just begun, but it was a great beginning.”

From small acorns, great oak trees can grow…. 

However, the Israelis were after bigger fish: they were simultaneously—and secretly—negotiating what became the Abraham Accords. What if, instead, the Arabs and the Americans had put their weight behind some kind of Palestinian solution? Would there be peace today in Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Yemen, even Iran? Would tens of thousands be alive with their weapons beaten into proverbial plowshares?

Unfortunately, history—especially in the Middle East—doesn’t work that way. By July 2021, when Borri interviewed another Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, he told her, “Gaza has been under siege for 14 years, now, cut off from everything and everyone: 14 years—the martyrs of untreated illnesses or poorly treated illnesses, the martyrs of a life without electricity, without water, without anything, of a life which is not life. They are not in the death tolls and yet they are dead. Gaza hits the headlines only with rockets. And that’s why rockets go on.”

“On October 7th, the year 2023 had already been the bloodiest year since the Second Intifada. But the world believed a peace process was underway. As Yahya Sinwar said: The peace of the grave.”    

Francesca Borri

So, as Francesca Borri recently discussed on New Thinking for a New World, instead of seeking peace, however elusive, the Israelis suffered the horrors of October 7th and the Palestinians have endured the subsequent 13 month-and-counting brutal Israeli assault. Borri’s take? “I’m a war reporter, and I live with the people I write about. War isn’t divided between civilians and combatants anymore. There is not even a frontline, there is just a front area, and everything is a target. And the first thing you learn in war, wherever there is a place like a hospital, a bread line, wherever there is a gathering of civilians, that’s the danger.”

“In Gaza, when you ask children how old they are they say: I am 7 years and three wars old.”
Francesca Borri

That is a good description of Gaza today where many tens of thousands have been killed and maimed, malnutrition and disease are rife, countless futures destroyed, and much of the physical infrastructure leveled. All is seemingly out of proportion even to the butchery of October 7th. Perhaps the Palestinians are just collateral damage of a larger Israeli strategy? Borri certainly thinks so: “The plan is quite clear: the annexation of most of the West Bank, the occupation of northern Gaza, a low-intensity conflict with Lebanon, and most of all, carefully calibrated pressure on Iran—until its collapse from within.”

Yet the immediate targets are the Palestinians. The question is how many Palestinians will stay. “After one year, when children are not in school, people leave. We saw this with Syrian refugees. This will happen in Gaza too. At some point, Palestinians will leave. And Gaza doesn’t exist anymore, because it’s not just its buildings. Gaza is lost.”

“It is up to Israel to decide what the children of Gaza will become. Those who are staring at the sea, right now, while Gaza burns.”
Francesca Borri   

But Borri insists that would not be the end of the Palestinians. “I am not saying that by leaving, Palestinians will forget Palestine. The Palestinian identity is quite different from most other national identities. War and conflict strengthen these identities. We have seen it with Ukrainians, who became more Ukrainian when they were attacked by Russia. So, leaving doesn’t mean forgetting.”

Indeed, Meshal made the same point to her in the 2021 interview, “Israel was established in 1948. And yet, in such a long time we have lost nothing of our identity. My son was born in Kuwait. But ask him where he is from, and like all children of refugees, he will say: I’m from Silwad (note: a town near Ramallah). Because that’s where he is from; where his background is. Regardless of geography.”

Borri draws a sharp distinction between Hamas and Palestinians. As she said on New Thinking for a New World, “Palestinians in Gaza are bearing the brunt of Yahya Sinwar’s decisions more than anyone else. And if I know Gaza a little bit, when the Palestinians in Gaza speak again they will be furious with Hamas, with Israel, with the international community, with the West Bank, with the Palestinian Authority, with all of us.”

In a subsequent conversation, she added that Palestinians blame Hamas for an attack that was poorly planned and poorly carried out, turning into a hostage-taking operation that became a butchery. “When Mousa Abu Marzouk, one of Hamas founders, was asked why Hamas had not built tunnels and shelters for civilians, he said that the protection of civilians is a UN task. And, Ismail Haniyeh said on al-Jazeera that Palestinians need the blood of children to awaken the revolutionary spirit.”

“Hamas is over—politically and militarily. It is in disarray. There are still guns around, yes. And gunmen. Gaza can still be turned into a Vietnam of ambushes and IEDs, but nothing more. And yet the idea of ​​Hamas is now more powerful than ever.”
Francesca Borri  

What happens next? Will the elusive ceasefire occur? How will this end?

“There won’t be any ceasefire. And honestly, not only because that’s not what Netanyahu wants, but because there is no deal on the ‘Day After,’ on the government of Gaza. And this is entirely the Palestinians’ fault. It is not up to Israel or to the Arab countries or the UN or the international community to decide who should be in power in Gaza: it is up to the Palestinians. But so far, there is no agreement.”

Meanwhile, Borri insists that Netanyahu wants regime change in Iran. “That’s why the war is still raging. Not because he wants to keep his power…Netanyahu is well aware that’s the only way to be remembered not as the prime minister of October 7th, but as the statesman who rose from the ashes, and reshaped the Middle East.”

“Until the next October 7th, of course.”

Francesca Borri recently joined Alan Stoga on the New Thinking for a New World podcast series. Listen to their conversation in the episode Welcome to Dante’s Inferno, available here or on your preferred platform (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc).

Francesca Borri was born in Italy in 1980. She holds a Master’s in International Relations, a Master’s in Human Rights, and a Bachelor’s in Philosophy of Law. After a first experience in the Balkans, she worked in the Middle East as a human rights officer. She turned to journalism in February 2012 to cover the war in Syria as captured in her book Syrian Dust. She is also the author of books on Kosovo (2008), Israel and Palestine (2010), and Aleppo (2014). In 2017, she was shortlisted for the European Press Prize for her reporting from the Maldives, the non-Arab country with the highest per capita number of foreign fighters. Destination Paradise, the book based on that reportage, was published in 2018. She now writes forLa Repubblica, Italy’s leading newspaper. Her next book, Jenin Qassam, will be out in December.

He argues that the election between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump is framed by a widely held set of voter concerns:

“They are losing their trust. They don’t trust government. They don’t trust big institutions. They don’t trust colleges. They don’t trust church. They obviously have lost their trust in the media…

 

84% of all voters, of all demographics, of all political stripes agree with this statement: ‘An elite of incumbent politicians of both parties, lobbyists, big banks, big unions, big business, big special interest, big media have rigged the system to protect their own power and prestige’….They believe that the system is so broken that it has made our government inept and corrupt.”

“When I joined the Democrats back in the early 1970s, it was a blue-collar party,” says Miller. “Today it is urban, maybe advanced degree, certainly college-educated, as well as long-standing older Democrats who are just faithful to the party…Blacks still trust the Democrats more than the Republicans. But Hispanics are in play; Asians are in play.”

As for Trump, Miller argues that 20% of his supporters are hard-core loyalists. But most of the rest are working class. “Which means they have no college degree, they have less than $100,000 annual income. They are across the board demographically. They are pragmatic, by necessity [and] they are moderate by circumstances…They probably go to the church their parents went to. They probably send their kids to the school they went to. And when they go out on a work crew in the morning, they go with whoever the hell the company sends them out with. So they just learn to get along.”

It’s unclear whether issues really matter to how voters vote, although they have strong opinions about which candidate they trust to do better on a given issue. That said, most voters rank economic issues as of prime importance, while abortion is critical to an important segment of voters—but single-issue voters are becoming rare.

The campaigns

Miller is a campaign pro, having run or advised many national, state, and city campaigns during his long career, and he thinks Harris is doing a terrific job so far. “The Harris campaign has been stunningly good… considering that, when it began, her approval rating was about 35%— lower, in fact, than Trump and lower than Biden. And it is now at 44 and probably rising. That’s kind of amazing in the short time that she’s been campaigning…She came out to my surprise with great discipline…The energy she restored to the Party was amazing. The convention was just about perfect as a vibe convention, as she described it.”

In contrast, Trump “has run a terrible campaign…He’s running a sort of meandering campaign. Yes, there was some empathy, even sympathy for assassination attempt number one and maybe number two. But it’s not been a great campaign and JD Vance has not been a terrific addition.”

On the other hand, as amazing as it might seem, somehow Trump comes across as a “centrist; not too liberal, not too conservative.” And his negative view of America going down the drain resonates with many voters, especially those who are undecided or persuadable.

For Miller, Trump’s bottom line for the persuadable voters who will eventually decide the election is “after they say, ‘I’m worse off than I was four years ago,’ are they going to go in [to the voting booth] and say ‘But he’s just too damn crazy?” Miller points out they did the opposite in 2016, which is why Trump won.

The swing states

Of course, because the U.S. President is chosen by the Electoral College, which combines “winner take all” with a disproportionate weight for smaller population states, the election will ultimately be decided by a relative handful of voters in six or seven swing states. Miller points out that the Biden/Trump election in which 155 million people voted was effectively decided by 44,000 voters in three states. This year, he’s looking at 6 or 7 swing states: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Georgia, North Carolina, Arizona, maybe Nevada—and, according to the NY Times/Sienna polling (which Miller believes is one of the best)—the candidates are virtually tied in those states, as they are nationally.

Thus, the undecideds, who comprise about 4% of the voters in each state, will eventually become the deciders!

One word about Electoral College votes. Based on how the other 43 states seem likely to vote, Harris would need to capture at least 44 of the swing states’ 93 electoral votes, while Trump would need 51. So, if Vice President Harris actually won Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin where she currently enjoys a small lead, she would become President Harris.

The decision

How will the undecided decide?

Miller points out that, although every modern U.S. election seems to be about change, the mood of the electorate this cycle probably means that the candidate who captures the “change” flag will ultimately win the election. Miller notes that “Vice President Harris has done a terrific job of trying to change the context from liberal versus conservative to new versus old. If she’s new, she probably wins. If she’s more of the same, she probably loses.” The challenge is how to do that while running as an incumbent, chosen as the candidate by the vote of one man (Joe Biden) who isn’t particularly popular, trying to run on his record, while at the same time suggesting that she would be a better version of Biden.

That she has a lot of work to do is evidenced by a recent NY Times/Sienna national poll finding that 52% of respondents see Harris as representing “more of the same” and only 25% think she would make major changes. In contrast, almost 50% said that Trump represents major change; whether good change or bad change might be another story.

For all his campaign experience, at the end of the day Miller is surprised that the race is as tight as it is. “Something’s holding back Kamala Harris. I know there’s racism; I know there’s sexism; and I know there’s anti-Bidenism. She should be running away with this, but she’s not.”

Why not? Miller goes back to the sour mood that hangs over American politics:  “People used to say that politics takes good people and makes them corrupt.Now they say, politics attracts corrupt people and makes them politicians.”

Donald Trump cannot persuade the persuadables that he is different, because he is not. Can Kamala Harris? Or was Pope Francis, in an extraordinary act of political interference, right when he recently said: “You must choose the lesser evil“? Who is the lesser evil? That lady, or that gentleman? I don’t know. Everyone, in conscience, (has to) think and do this.”

What do you think? Let us know in the comments below.

***

Scott Miller recently spoke with Alan Stoga as part of the Tällberg Foundation’s “New Thinking for a New World” podcast series. Listen to their conversation here or find us on a podcast platform of your choice (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc.)

ABOUT SCOTT MILLER

• “Exploding pagers wreak havoc among Hezbollah”—The Times
• “Sinwar Says Hamas Ready for ‘Long War of Attrition’”—Asharq Al-Awsat
• “Houthis claim downing another US MQ-9 Reaper drone”—Al Jazeera
• “Gaza death toll reaches 41,226 amid relentless Israeli assault”—Anadolu Ajansi
• “Ex-Defense Minister Target of Hezbollah Assassination Attempt”—Jerusalem Post

The Middle East is a mess, perhaps on “the brink of a regional war” as the Jordanian Foreign Minister worried aloud a few days ago—and there is no doubt that the objective circumstances, never mind the tabloid headlines, are awful and worsening.

However, maybe what’s amazing about the Middle East today is not how violent it is. Perhaps what’s amazing is how violent it isn’t.  

That’s not to minimize the non-stop, deadly violence in Gaza or the Israeli losses or the continuing charnel house of Syria or the Houthi attacks on shipping or the ping ponging attacks among the Israelis, Iranians, Hezbollah and other non-state actors. Rather, considering all the hatred and killing, it is almost incredible that there has not been a bigger conflagration. 

Why not?

The Americans would probably argue that their efforts—in partnership primarily with the Qataris and Egyptians—have prevented that bigger explosion. Of course, that’s possible, but many people in the region seem to see the United States as more part of the problem than of the solution: a biased arbiter who pretends to be neutral, a great power who is reluctant to exercise power, a negotiator who won’t or can’t engage directly with some of the countries and groups who matter most to solving anything. Indeed, those shortcomings may be why the various “deals” pursued by the White House over the past months never close: the security agreement with the Saudis, the Saudi-Israeli rapprochement, and the serial Gaza ceasefires-about-to-happen.

Thank God they are trying, but “A” for effort, and “F” for results.

The question remains whether the fact that the objectively bad regional situation has not gotten dramatically worse is a sign that worse is yet to come or, possibly, that some new dynamic could be at work.

Suspend disbelief for a moment. What if the ongoing change in leadership around the Gulf is opening space for some new thinking about how to manage regional politics? What if the Great Powers’ boots-on-the-ground military and political interventions that were common throughout the 20th and into the 21st century are more or less finished?  What if the hatreds that have driven the Sunni-Shia and Israeli-Arab conflicts have actually dissipated, not intensified in spite or even because of the slaughter in Gaza? What if the larger countries in the regions are beginning to wonder if they might have more in common with each other than with distant Great Powers who, in any event, have become unreliable? What if agency is shifting from outside to inside the region? Could the leaders of the region do what the Americans, Russians, British, French and others could not do: create peace for themselves?

Pie in the sky, probably. But is there any evidence that even suggests this kind of alternative reality could be bubbling below the surface?

• Of course, the absence of something is never proof of something else. But as angry as most Arabs are at Israel (in a January poll of 16 Arab countries two-thirds of respondents said that the October 7th attacks were legitimate and almost all expressed support for Palestinians*), the infamous “Arab street” has been remarkably quiet despite the horrific casualties of the Gaza war. Perhaps ordinary people want peace and prosperity more than war and ideology.

• What about Israel? Under Bibi Netanyahu, the country seems driven, not only to revenge the October 7 attacks, but to destroy as many of its enemies as possible, despite massive collateral damage (which Palestinians believe is anything but “collateral”) and international opprobrium. The bloodletting comes with huge costs: the IDF is exhausted; the economy is under pressure; the domestic political divides have become deeper and more personal; more Jews are leaving than migrating to the country. Arguably Israel’s future direction is less clear than it has been in decades. Once Bibi leaves the stage, isn’t it likely that Israel will do what it always does after its wars: find new leaders and recalibrate its future? As Israeli Leora Hadar said on New Thinking for a New World, “We have to explore the new opportunities that can arise from such a terrible disaster.”

• The election of President Pezeshkian in Iran could be an important shift in Iran’s attitude, building on last year’s rapprochement with Saudia Arabia. As Hussain Mousavian recently said on New Thinking for a New World, “Pezeshkian had been disqualified by the Guardian Council, but with the support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, he was able to enter the election and win. Therefore, as of now, he has the support of the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard, the Reformist moderate faction, and the moderate conservatives.” Is it possible that the Iranian people and even their leaders are beginning to realize that leading the “Axis of Resistance” will never make life more livable for them?

• None of the Arab countries who have formally recognized Israel—Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—broke ties after the Gaza fighting started. That would certainly have happened a decade or two ago.

• Economic relationships remain relatively robust, at least in context.  Bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Egypt during the first five months of 2024 totaled roughly $2 billion.  Even the Saudis are letting trade and investment continue and expand—no boycotts to be seen.

• As for the Saudis, they continue to negotiate what they insist must be an irrevocable security agreement with the United States (which presumably means ratified by the U.S. Senate) while the U.S. insists such a deal must be paired with a bilateral Saudi/Israeli agreement including diplomatic recognition. Whether or not the Israelis are also still part of the negotiation is unknown. However, as unlikely as it might seem today, British Arabist Neil Quilliam insisted in a recent Tällberg podcast, “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman…has made very bold moves in the past and I think if, if he believed it was in Saudi Arabia’s interest to normalize, he would just go ahead and do so.”

• Then there is China whose relationship with Iran has clearly intensified, but which seems to want to add diplomatic and security elements to its already outsized economic and financial relations with the Saudis, Emiratis and others. The most visible manifestation was the role played by Beijing in facilitating renewed diplomatic ties between Teheran and Riyadh, but there is evidence that China is also actively seeking inroads as a weapons supplier (including ballistic missile technology) and possibly in the intelligence and cybersecurity areas. Could China, with its non-intervention philosophy and economic and financial clout, become the makeweight that keeps Iran and Saudi Arabia in balance instead of at each other’s throats (a role that the United States cannot play)?

• Indeed, it’s possible—as Mousavian also argued in Tällberg’s podcast—“that the Gaza war…could be a factor for cooperation and convergence between Iran and its neighbors, with even the possibility of establishing a collective cooperation system.” Admittedly, his idea that Persians and Arabs could be brought together because of shared support for Palestinians necessarily excludes the Israelis.

But the Israelis can’t be excluded; they have long since passed the point when they could be pushed into the sea, anxieties reawakened by October 7th notwithstanding. However, the politically incorrect question is whether the Palestinians can be excluded.

Arguably, that proposition was tested over the past decade or so as the Palestinian cause slipped from visibility almost everywhere, as Arab countries explored new relationships with Israel (including out of sight security cooperation), and as living conditions in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Jordanian camps deteriorated. But ‘out of sight, out of mind’ probably ended on October 7th.

Why only probably? Because, as described above, there is little evidence that the Gaza war has really changed the attitudes that allowed the Palestinians to be ignored in recent years. And because the only idea for a new way forward is a tired old idea—the “two state solution”—that large majorities of the people of the proposed two states reject.** It seems beyond unlikely that the outside powers who like the proposal could or would be prepared to impose such a settlement, which makes it (still) dead on arrival.

But will concern, even sympathy, for the Palestinians be enough to retard what seems to be a slow movement towards a different kind of Middle East more generally? Perhaps it should, but history rarely works that way.

None of this is to suggest that the peace and harmony are about to break out in the region; there are too many actual and potential conflicts and too much ongoing death and destruction.

But at other times and other places the carnage of war has become the cradle of peace.

Could it be happening in the Middle East? Is that new thinking or crazy thinking? Tell us what you think in the comments below.

* Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha Institute), January 2024:
https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/News/Pages/arab-public-opinion-about-the-israeli-war-on-gaza.aspx

**According to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2024 , sixty-six percent of Jewish Israelis and 61% of Palestinians believe the other side wants to commit genocide against them, and an additional 27% of Jewish Israelis and 26% of Palestinians say the other side wants to conquer the land “from the river to the sea” and expel them. 94% of Palestinians and 86% of Israelis say that the other side cannot be trusted.

PODCAST EPISODES MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE

Israeli’s Divided House
Israel is at war with external threats like Hamas and Iran, but internal divisions are also deepening. Over 75% of Israelis are worried about political rifts and religious tensions, which have been exacerbated by recent extremist incidents. This episode explores these internal conflicts through the voices of Leora Hadar, a West Bank settler and peace activist, and Naty Barak, a kibbutz resident and sustainability expert.

A New Iran?
This summer, Iranians elected Masoud Pezeshkian, a reform-minded cardiac surgeon, as president, defying expectations that hardliners would dominate. Uncertainties remain about his support from Iran’s Supreme Leader and Revolutionary Guards, and his ability to tackle major domestic and international issues, including Western sanctions. Former Iranian diplomat and Princeton scholar Hossein Mousavian discusses Pezeshkian’s presidency, Iran’s future, and the implications for Western negotiations.

Deal of the Century?
The past eight months in the Middle East have been marked by significant turmoil, including the horror of October 7th, ongoing violence in Gaza, civilian casualties across the region, and rising tensions between Iran and Israel. Amidst this chaos, American diplomats are pursuing a bold diplomatic solution: a three-way agreement where the U.S. provides a defense guarantee for Saudi Arabia, which would sign a peace treaty with Israel, leading to the end of the Gaza war and a commitment to the two-state solution. This episode features Neil Quilliam, a British expert on Saudi Arabia, discussing the potential and challenges of this ambitious plan.

Moshe Dayan, April 1956, eulogy for a murdered Israeli settler

The many Israelis who forgot Dayan’s prescient words amidst the prosperity of a modern, almost European state, were brutally reminded of them on October 7th. But does that brutal awakening foreshadow a national willingness to think differently about Gaza and the West Bank or will it deepen the evident unwillingness to negotiate a lasting settlement? Indeed, is a settlement even possible among people who have well-documented reasons to distrust and even hate each other? Could the Gaza war be the tipping point that forces Palestinians and Israelis to define a different future? Or will today’s violence and terror simply produce more violence and terror?

Two recent New Thinking for a New World podcasts point in different directions. Former Egyptian diplomat Nabil Fahmy argued, “[Diplomacy] is the only option we have if we want to stop the cycle of violence.” It’s fair to say that American journalist Armin Rosen seems skeptical that such an option exists: “I think what happened was so horrific, that there’s a sense across all of [Israeli] society that the group that did this can’t be allowed to survive, that it’s worth taking on great sacrifices to destroy it.”

Ironically, the very brutality of October 7 as well as the fact that Hamas has somehow survived seven months of Israeli assault might doom the diplomacy that Fahmy believes is critical. There seems to be almost no Israeli interest in a negotiation any bigger than hostages-for-ceasefire (which Fahmy points out makes little sense to Hamas if it wants to survive). According to Fahmy, “If this doesn’t become a larger issue for the world, the politicians on the ground will be unable to take strong decisions. We will end up having a series of ceasefires, low scale confrontations, and then major confrontations every now and then.”

At the same time, Rosen says, “People can ask whether October 7th was a success for Hamas…Hamas’s objective diplomatic status has improved: the Qataris did not kick them out; the Turks are more pro-Hamas than they have ever been; and the United States government is not immune from this either… [Hamas] has managed to create diplomatic facts that are very much in their favor despite October 7th and despite losing on the battlefield.” If that’s true, is there any possibility that Israel, having failed to destroy Hamas, would accept it as a negotiating partner—one that somehow has gained international legitimacy as a result of its terrorism?

Hard to believe, but Fahmy keeps his eyes fixed on the prize. “How do we stop this from happening again? The only way is to solve the problem…Violence breeds violence.” Fahmy, who spent much of his career dealing with failed Middle East peace attempts, proposes a comprehensive ten-point action plan that would be embedded in a new U.N. Security Council resolution:

• Ceasefire and the provision of humanitarian assistance;
• Exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinians in Israeli prisons;
• Development of a security arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians to ensure non-use of force;
• Withdrawal of Israel from Gaza;
• International support for reconstruction and return of Palestinians;
• International recognition of a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, including possible admission to the United Nations;
• Creation of a technocratic government among the Palestinian factions to govern Gaza and the West Bank;
• Call for elections both by Palestinians and Israelis in the next 12 months;
• Reaffirmation of the Beirut Summit Declaration which says that when there is a solution between Palestine and Israel there will be normal relations between Israel and all the Arab states;
• Establishment of the objective to negotiate a two-state solution within 24 months

Of course, the devil would be in the details, but the bigger question is whether Israel and the Palestinians have the bandwidth—and, perhaps, the courage—to embrace such a diplomatic and political “Everything, Everywhere All at Once” agenda?

Rosen would probably be skeptical. He argues that “The two-state solution remains a very specific kind of American idea, born out of the Western victory in the Cold War. It’s the idea that this is a unipolar world where things that seemed impossible are possible now and that the kind of inherent morality of American global leadership could bring about these massive shifts that people previously thought could never happen…[The two-state solution] is part of the catechism of the American elite.”

That might be right, but it begs the question whether the United States is still the indispensable nation in the search for Middle Eastern peace and prosperity as it has been since Henry Kissinger’s 1973 diplomacy. Now it is Fahmy’s turn to be skeptical. “America has moved from wanting to be a global power with the benefits and responsibilities, to being a superpower, which basically means [America is] stronger and richer than anybody else and can have influence without responsibility.” In effect, Fahmy argues that U.S. participation in a comprehensive effort is necessary but not sufficient. “I want the legitimacy of the U.N…I don’t believe that America alone is useful, but I don’t think that the Permanent Five [of the U.N. Security Council] without America works.”

Inherent in that view is the idea that the United States might no longer see its national interest as entirely coincident with Israel’s. Rosen certainly thinks that is the case, arguing not only that U.S. officials have effectively adopted some of Hamas’ negotiating positions, but that the U.S. forced Israel not to respond aggressively to the April 13th Iranian missile and drone attack. He says, “The [Iranian] regime figured out that they didn’t really need to make any concessions to the United States at all over the past 10 to 15 years, rather that they could create a reality in which the US could become its de facto protector against the Israelis.”

Washington would undoubtedly object to that assertion. However, everything that has happened since October 7th makes the case that, as Fahmy puts it, “The Middle East is being recalibrated.” His fear is that “if we recalibrate it into a mold where nation states don’t have credibility or authority, where non-state actors can express their anger because we can’t provide them with solutions, it’s going to be a very unstable situation.”

He could have added that instability in the Middle East rarely stays in the Middle East.

PODCAST EPISODES

Things Are Never So Bad They Can’t Get Worse…
In the wake of the violent October 7 events and the subsequent Israeli response in Gaza, the region faces a dire humanitarian crisis. Despite the bleak history of peace efforts, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy discusses the urgent need for renewed attempts to achieve lasting peace and prosperity for both Palestinians and Israelis. Join him as he explores potential paths to a peaceful future beyond the cycle of violence.
LISTEN HERE

War Lessons
The conflict between Hamas and Israel, which began with Hamas terrorists’ actions, has escalated into a wider war involving various factions and nations. Journalist Armin Rosen discusses the ongoing conflict’s impact on the Middle East’s political landscape, including questions about security, statehood for Palestinians, and the potential for broader regional conflict.
LISTEN HERE

ABOUT OUR GUESTS

Armin Rosen is a New York-based senior writer for Tablet Magazine. He has reported from across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East for a range of publications, including the New Republic, the Atlantic, and the Wall Street Journal. Before working at Tablet he was military and defense editor at Business Insider, where he received an International Reporting Project fellowship to fund a series of articles about Niger’s uranium industry. He has written dozens of essays and reported pieces for Tablet, including definitive profiles of Ilhan Omar and Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant.

Nabil Fahmy, a career diplomat, served as Egypt’s Foreign Minister from July 2013 to June 2014, guiding the country’s diplomacy through challenging times. He reoriented Egypt’s foreign policy, broadening its options globally and regionally. Over three decades, Fahmy held prominent diplomatic roles including Ambassador to the United States and Japan. He chaired the UN advisory board on disarmament and was Vice-Chairman of the UN General Assembly’s first committee on disarmament and international security. He played key roles in various multilateral events and was honored by the Japanese Emperor. Fahmy founded the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo in 2009, serving as its dean until 2022. His latest English book, “Egypt’s Diplomacy in War, Peace, and Transition”(2020), and an updated Arabic book, “From the Heart of Events” (2022), shed light on the challenges of statecraft over the past fifty years.

Oleksiy Arestovych, former spokesman for President Zelensky

The Russian war on Ukraine continues to evolve. The 2022 version of a war that was initially launched in 2014 has shifted from failed Russian blitzkrieg, to valiant Ukrainian defense, to dramatic Ukrainian pushback, to unsuccessful Ukrainian counteroffensive, and now to war of attrition where Russia looks to be winning on the battlefield. The problem is that wars of attrition between two unfairly matched opponents are almost always won by the big guy—in this case, Russia with five times the population and an economy ten times larger than Ukraine.

NATO committed itself to make up the difference, at least in terms of arms, munitions and intelligence—but no boots on the ground or planes in the air. However, as the “fighting season” (itself a weird throwback in a hyper-modern world) resumes, that commitment is falling short, Ukraine’s valiant military seems exhausted, and the country is on the back foot as the Russian juggernaut presses forward.

George Beebe, Director of the Quincy Institute’s Grand Strategy Program and former top CIA Russian analyst, proposed a historical comparison during a recent New Thinking for a New World podcast episode. “During the American Civil War, the North had all kinds of advantages in population and industry; the South had better generalship. Their hope was to outmaneuver the North. Eventually, after a period where they performed well beyond expectations, the advantages that the North had were overwhelming.” And we know how that ended.

The implication for the Ukraine war? “Ukraine’s counter-offensive last year was its shot at turning this into a war of maneuver, breaking through Russian defenses, forcing the Russians to sue for peace. And that didn’t work…The Russians are quite steadily exhausting Ukraine’s supplies of manpower and they have drained a lot of the West’s stockpiles of arms and ammunition.”

Logically, that only leaves a miracle—think David’s slingshot knocking out Goliath—or a negotiated settlement. The “never surrender” crowd in Kyiv, Washington and various European capitals insist that the next big infusion of artillery shells or jet fighters or whatever will do the trick. Beebe isn’t buying the argument; he says that—short of a direct NATO/Russia confrontation—the Russians can easily match and exceed the number and quality of the weapons that the West is likely to make available to Ukrainian fighters.

That leaves the “n-word.” Beebe argues that negotiations—sooner rather than later—are not only possible, but are in the best interests of Ukraine, Russia and the West

What do each of them need to settle the conflict?

• “Ukraine needs to have a secure, independent country in which it is able to be sovereign and to conduct its internal affairs as it sees fit.”

• Russia needs to be recognized “as a great power in the world,” needs relief from efforts “to exclude Russia as a player in European security and to move the NATO alliance right up to Russia’s borders—and in so doing foment regime change or cripple its economy.”

• The United States and the West “need a stable European security environment in which Western states can thrive as free democratic liberal polities; in other words, a European security environment that is safe for democracy.”

What’s obviously missing from Beebe’s inventory is territory. When President Zelensky was in Washington in December, he insisted that land is non-negotiable: “We are not going to give up territories to terrorists.”

While that is a good sound bite, Beebe insists, “It’s clear to me at this point that the Ukrainians are not going to be able to take back territory on the battlefield, and it’s clear to me that the Russians are not going to give it up at the negotiating table. So, we’re probably going to be in a situation where we will have a fait accompli that does not have to be addressed in order to stabilize the war.” He points out a long history of precedents—the Baltics during the Cold War, Korea, Cyprus and others more recently—where governments have learned “to live with a situation that it doesn’t officially recognize but has to deal with in reality.”

As goes Korea or Cyprus might go Ukraine?

Of course, lots of people would not be happy with that outcome, including many Ukrainians. This might be a classic case where the good is the enemy of the better—or, given the circumstances, the bad is better than the worse. If the Russians cannot get what Beebe thinks is one of their minimal demands—Ukraine excluded from NATO or from a significant (i.e., American) American bilateral security guarantee—then “I think [the Russian] Plan B is we’ll simply wreck Ukraine. They will so devastate Ukraine physically and economically that Ukraine won’t be able to rebuild. Those millions of refugees that have fled will not return. Ukraine will go into a terminal swoon that will leave it looking a lot more like Libya than like Poland or Germany.”

He insists that does not seem to be Russia’s preference; indeed, during negotiations after the invasion had started in 2022 the Russians had accepted in principle that Ukraine could join the European Union, but not NATO. Beebe argues that “a less corrupt, less ethno-nationalist,” more economically vibrant Ukraine—even one that “feels economically and culturally part of Europe”—would not be seen as a threat by the Russians.  In contrast, they refuse to accept a “Ukraine linked to a military presence of the United States.”

Ergo, EU, ok; NATO, never.

Perhaps the biggest block to even framing a negotiation in practice has been American and European insistence that only the Ukrainians deserve to be at the negotiating table. Beebe thinks that’s a dead end and not remotely in American (or, for that matter, Ukrainian) national interests.  “The Russians believe that this is not just between them and Ukraine. They believe that this is fundamentally a conflict between Russia and the United States, and between incompatible conceptions of what the European security order ought to look like.” His clear estimate is that, if Russia’s perceptions are not addressed, then the war will go on until either Ukraine is defeated or the conflict escalates into something much larger in scope.

The final, obvious question: if President Putin is winning, why would he negotiate? Beebe’s answer: The Russians “could turn Ukraine into an Iraq if they felt that they had to in order to prevent its military alliance with the United States. But they cannot fight their way into a recognized, legitimate role in Europe’s security situation…nor a normal relationship with the West…nor reduced dependence on China.”

The punch line? “Those broader geostrategic set of interests are the biggest incentive that Russians have for talking. And that gives the United States some leverage that we should take advantage of in trying to bring this war to an end.”

One huge caveat: if Ukraine collapses—which Beebe believes is possible—then “The Russians dictate the terms of a settlement, and those terms are not likely to be ones that we like.” Thus, continued U.S. support is critical, but with the goal of negotiating a stable settlement.  

“The real question is [do we have] the confidence, politically, to pursue that? We talk about negotiating from a position of strength. That strength is not just military strength; it also is strength of character…And I think that’s what we’re lacking right now, the confidence to believe that we can compromise with the Russians and still survive and even thrive, which I think objectively is true. We can do this.”

Amen.

***

George Beebe recently spoke with Alan Stoga as part of the Tällberg Foundation’s “New Thinking for a New World” podcast series. Listen to their conversation here or find us on a podcast platform of your choice (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc)

ABOUT OUR GUEST
George Beebe is the director of the Grand Strategy Program at the Quincy Institute in Washington. George spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy advisor, including as director of the CIA’s Russia analysis, director of the CIA’s Open Source Center, and as a staff advisor on Russia matters to Vice President Cheney. His book, The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe (St. Martin’s Press, 2019), warned how the United States and Russia could stumble into a dangerous military confrontation. Prior to joining QI, George was Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National Interest and before that he served as president of a technology company that measured the impact of events, issues, and advertising campaigns on audience views. He speaks Russian and German.

Source: PEW RESEARCH CENTER, DECEMBER 5, 2022 Note: Those who did not answer not shown. Median is Sweden, Singapore, Germany, Netherlands, Australia, Canada, UK, Belgium, Poland, Malaysia, South Korea, Israel, Hungary, France, Japan, US, Italy, Greece, Spain.

Elisabeth Braw, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, seems focused on the first of that list: we, the people.  As she argued in a recent New Thinking for a New World podcast, “Those of us living in liberal democracies—those of us who have never experienced any other form of society—we take liberal democracy for granted.  We just assume it will always be around, because that’s the only way of life we know. But there is nothing guaranteed about liberal democracy. It requires everybody to pitch in to help maintain it, because otherwise it will collapse under the pressure, burden, and attacks of those who hate democracy.”

That’s an important point, but not a unique argument.  What is at least unusual about Braw’s framing is her point of departure: a book written by Austrian philosopher Karl Popper, begun in 1938 and finished in 1945.  “The Open Society and Its Enemies” was Popper’s reaction to Hitler and his abuse of Germany’s democratic system to seize power.

As Braw recalled, Popper formulated the paradox of tolerance when he wrote:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance.  If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. – Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies

That raises an obvious question and a huge dilemma.  As Braw puts it, “At what point do you have to become intolerant?  If you attack somebody in the name of ideology, you are prosecuted for it. But if you criticize that person, you don’t go to jail because we have freedom of speech. But, what we are seeing today is that you can do so much harm to society at large by exploiting that freedom….if there are elements of society that are willing to engage in very provocative acts and indeed trigger violence through their words and through their actions—even if they don’t physically attack anybody—then we have to start entertaining the notion that we should be less tolerant of radical views simply because liberal democracy is not guaranteed to exist.”

Albeit cautiously, Braw echoes Popper:

As long as we can counter them [intolerant philosophies] by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument… We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places Itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal. – Karl Popper, Open Society and its Enemies

All of this is not a theoretical exercise; Braw is deeply concerned about developments this past summer in Sweden which led that country to fear increased Islamic terrorism in reaction to several instances of public Koran desecrations.  

That story began with Sweden’s decision to join NATO and the consequent need for Turkey’s acquiescence.  But Turkey’s President Erdogan drove a hard bargain, including a demand for the repatriation of Turkish Kurds who live in Sweden and are protected by Swedish law.  The Swedes and Turks were (and still are) at a stalemate, which made Sweden vulnerable to incidents that might inflame Muslim—including Turkish—public opinion.  A couple of provocateurs took advantage of the opportunity to desecrate Korans in public events protected by Sweden’s deep commitment to freedom of speech, deplored by Swedish authorities who had no legal right to intervene.

The results included “a massive disinformation campaign against Sweden, propagated primarily by Arabic and Russian language accounts on social media; condemnation by the governments of Iran, Iraq, and a few other countries; attacks on the Swedish embassy in Baghdad; and massive Muslim anger against Sweden,” says Braw.  In addition, Sweden’s Security Service was forced to raise its assessment of the level of terrorism threat against the country and, according to Prime Minister Kristersson, succeeded in deflecting several specific attacks.  

But all of that, insists Braw, was based on deliberate misinformation since the Swedish government does not support Quran burnings, but lacks the right to ban them.  And that’s the double bind: to meet the demands of the Muslim protestors to stop what is (reluctantly) protected action in Sweden would mean changing the Swedish laws that protect free speech.  A slippery slope: defending democracy by curtailing democracy.

Braw suspects it might even be worse.  “Now if Sweden does changes legislation, it sends a message to the world that if you attack verbally and perhaps physically a liberal democracy strongly enough that liberal democracy will say ‘This is uncomfortable. We better compromise so that it doesn’t happen again.’   Of course, if you send that message as a liberal democracy, the side that is willing to engage in aggression against you will do even more of it.”  Indeed, she worries that if only liberal democracies are tolerant, “the other side doesn’t make concessions” and the slippery slope leads towards disaster.

The unfair question is whether what Braw describes is embedded in a clash of civilizations or religions and, hence, unique to the interactions between people of different cultures or worldviews or belief systems.  No, she insists, “This is a clash between those wanting to live in a tolerant way, and those who, for whatever reason, are keen to exploit that [tolerance] and use it for harm.”

If that’s right, might it apply to the harsh, divisive, extremes-driven version of American politics that has become that country’s new normal?  Braw worries that it could be.  “I’ve lived in America on and off since 1996, and…I’ve seen American society go from mostly friendly with people willing to engage with people of all political persuasions to this hyper-partisan environment.”  She blames the transformation partly on the nature and abuse of social media and partly on a breakdown of traditional American social institutions that used to cut across party and class lines.  The combination contributes to information bubbles, tunnel vision, and “in the most extreme of cases, involvement in conspiracy theories, which was obviously what triggered the January 6th attack on the Capitol.”

Does such a world sound too much like the one Popper was observing when he reflected on how the Nazis had undermined liberal democracies in the 1930s?  If so, how to preserve our democracies?  Where to draw the line on intolerance?  “I think the moment you have free speech that incites violence… that’s where you have to draw the line. We can have any number or manner of ugly opinions; we can allow those to exist within our societies and be expressed within our societies.”  But, she insists, “opinions that incite violence [should be] the red line to draw for what we can permit within our societies while remaining tolerant.”

Exactly what Karl Popper had in mind when he wrote about “the paradox of tolerance.” 

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What do you think? Let us know by commenting below

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Elisabeth Braw recently spoke with Alan Stoga as part of the Tällberg Foundation’s “New Thinking for a New World” podcast series. Listen to their conversation here or find us on a podcast platform of your choice  (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc).

ABOUT THE GUEST

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on defense against grayzone threats. She is also a columnist with Foreign Policy and Politico Europe, where she writes on national security and the globalized economy, and the author of The Defender’s Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Grayzone Aggression (2022).  Elisabeth is a member of GALLOS Technologies’ advisory board, a member of the UK National Preparedness Commission, an adviser to Willis Towers Watson’s research arm and a member of the steering committee of the Aurora Forum (the UK-Nordic-Baltic leader conference).

Elisabeth’s book Goodbye, Globalization: the Return of a Divided World will be published by Yale University Press in the new year. She regularly writes op-eds for the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Times and (writing in German) the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and is also the author of God’s Spies, about the Stasi (2019). Elisabeth attended university in Germany, graduating with a Magister Artium in political science and German literature.

Is it too late once the water is boiling?

In her new book, Pricing the Priceless: The Financial Transformation to Value the Planet, Solve the Climate Crisis, and Protect Our Most Precious Asset, Paula DiPerna emphatically argues that the key to escaping the boiling water is simple: put a seriously high price on carbon. As she writes, “Pricing makes an asset visible, illuminating the value of saving and protecting it, and the cost of losing it.”

The irony of what DiPerna has to say—in her book and in a recent New Thinking for a New World podcast—is that no one can disagree, either with her thesis or her examples. When she asks, “Why do our capital markets value companies like Uber which offer services we can live without at billions of dollars, but our atmosphere on which all life depends at ZERO?” even people addicted to their Uber accounts are likely to be stumped.

But hers is not a rhetorical question. In a world where the cost and consequences of abusing natural systems is everywhere increasingly evident, DiPerna’s conclusion is crystal clear: “The sluggish pace of infusing ecosystem service accounting and environmental economics into actual financial practice is the central cause of our climate change crisis.”

Admittedly, that’s not as exciting as protesters gluing themselves to a British highway or defacing classic artworks in the name of “Just Stop Oil,” but DiPerna is persuaded that analysis and action should focus on “do ability.” As she wrote, “It may well take several generations to make a complete transition out of current fossil fuel-based norms, if we ever can, especially given the paralysis that grips the world on this and virtually every other topic of global importance.”

So, how to break the paralysis? The problem is “the distinction between big ideas and executing big ideas. I feel that, as a practical matter, we’ve almost got no appetite left for big ideas.” We need action.

DiPerna explains the challenge using the metaphor of a slot machine, where the player is looking for three cherries. In the real world, she argues that action requires “science, policy and capital” all surfacing at the same time. However, the problem is that each of those works on a different logic and on a different timeline.

The scientific method is driven by experimentation, observations, results, published papers and peer review. Science can’t be rushed.

Policy is driven by politics, which is driven—at least in democracies—by electoral cycles. Even when politicians and policy makers have the scientific insights, action often does not follow, “Because first, they knew about but it was tomorrow [after the next election]; second, the public wasn’t clamoring for it; third, the inertia of a political system that gets heavier and heavier and heavier.” She goes on: “Even good, wishful, hopeful policy runs on a political timeline.”

Then there is capital, “Which operates on all kinds of timelines, as short as a quarterly returns call, as long as an intergenerational portfolio transfer from a grandfather to a granddaughter.” Capital will flow where returns can be found, but not without help.

DiPerna points out that “The three things have not aligned. What needs to happen is to align the scientific information with the application of capital with…regulatory certainty” created by policy makers who understand that providing a realistic, predictable carbon price is critical to moving the planet away from over consuming hydrocarbons and abusing natural systems.

DiPerna’s frustration is obvious in the podcast and in Pricing the Priceless. For example, she details an innovative financial innovation called the forest resilience bond that encourages investors to fund—and make money from funding—efforts to make forests resilient. “Money in up front, risk born by the investors, forest made more resilient, benefits later.” But only a couple such bonds have been issued; tiny compared to the problem of massive forest fires in the American West, Canada, Siberia and elsewhere. Why hasn’t the environmentalist premier of Canada issued bonds to renovate his country’s burning forests? Why hasn’t the head of JP Morgan, one of the largest and most innovative commercial banks, tried to persuade him to do so?  Her answer: “Such instruments are still fairly new.  So it could just be an informational problem.” Or maybe they aren’t paying attention…

Then she returns to her core point: “Without a carbon price none of the more exotic things are going to get anywhere.” But even at the center of things, programs to put a price on carbon have evolved slowly especially outside of Europe. According to the World Bank, today less than a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions are now covered by carbon taxes or emissions trading systems. Why?

DiPerna believes that, “People don’t do things because they’re afraid they’re not doable….You know, all these things I think can be done. It’s a question of imagination. Absence of imagination is an extremely important factor in why we’re stuck with this problem….It’s probably because it’s easier to kick the can, because the due date seems to keep being 2040, 2050.”

The problem, of course, is that the real “due date” is clearly much sooner. What to do? “I think part of the ‘do ability’ issue is people in authority [should ask] what can I do in five years? What can I actually do in five years? Can I get five years’ worth of reduction? Can I get five years’ worth of expanded forest resilience bonds? Can I get five years of anything that matters? And then, I could get five more and five more, but if we start, if everything is on a 20- or 40-year horizon, it’s just too easy not to do anything.”

Meanwhile, June 2023 was the hottest June on record according to the US government’s global temperature analysis.

What do you think? Let us know by commenting below

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Paula DiPerna recently spoke with Alan Stoga as part of the Tällberg Foundation’s “New Thinking for a New World” podcast series. Listen to their conversation here or find us on a podcast platform of your choice (Apple podcast, Spotify, Google podcast, Youtube, etc).

ABOUT THE GUEST

Paula DiPerna is a recognized expert in environmental finance issues and a strategic adviser on environmental and philanthropic policies to public and private organizations around the world. She serves currently as Special Advisor to CDP (formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project). In addition, Ms. DiPerna serves on the Distinguished Advisory Board of the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM); the Board of Advisors of Global Kids, whose mission is to develop global citizenship; and the Sustainability Advisory Council of Jupiter Asset Management. DiPerna also serves on the Board of Directors of The HistoryMakers in the US, the largest oral and video archive of profiles of 20th and 21st century African-American leaders across all sectors.

Previously, Ms. DiPerna was President of the International division of the Chicago Climate Exchange, President of the Joyce Foundation (a major public policy philanthropy known for innovation), and Vice President for International Affairs for the Cousteau Society, among other accomplishments. She is a widely published author and frequent public speaker.